mygaytrip.com The Caesars were, rather, dictators not unlike those of the Latin America of Ferrero's time-men arising from republics in crisis.
The Ceasars did not replace the central Roman institution, the Senate, which continued to govern the Empire well into the first century A. Equally, Ferrero refutes the claims of modern republican historians who, seizing upon ""the absurd tales told by Suetonius and Tacitus about the family of the Caesars, through preconceived hate for the monarchy,"" blacken the reputation of Caesarism, even as Mommsen whitewashed it. The real accomplishment of the Caesars was not to end the republic, for good or evil; it was to take possession of Gaul, and thus unwittingly to inaugurate Europe GDR V.
Ferrero particularly commends the study of Roman history to Americans, north and south. As heirs of republicanism, they must understand republicanism's weaknesses and strengths CE —, — They must understand, as Mommsen does not, the profoundly unbureaucratic character of republicanism, including the republicanism of the Caesars; Caesar Augustus, for example, several times liquidated the Empire's debt out of his own pocket ARMA 26, 29, 31; GDR II. Roman studies can refine Anglo-Saxon and German minds, and especially those minds that will rule their nations, with the civilized influence of Latinity CE vi—vii, — More important, the study of Roman history can ""train the men who govern nations to discern more clearly than may be possible from their own environments the truth underlying the legends.
By challenging partisan accounts, ancient and modern, Ferrero sets his reader on the way to combining learning and statesmanship. By pointing to the unintended consequences of the most herculean feats of the most prominent statesman, Ferrero also shows his reader, the future statesman, that a certain humility should go with learning and rulership. The Machiavellian fantasy of mastering Fortuna ought to be resisted; the wheel of destiny turns by a mysterious law, alike for families and for peoples: The Roman republicanism that Julius Caesar sought to save, not destroy, had its social basis in a patriarchal aristocracy.
The modern, individualist notion of matrimony and family as supports for personal happiness was ""alien to the Roman mind, which conceived of these from an essentially political and social point of view. The self-sufficiency of that household gave aristocrats the economic independence upon which political independence rested. In such a structure, marriage was scarcely to be entrusted to ""passion mobile as the sea,"" but to the prudential judgment of parents.
The household's day-to-day ruler, the matron, ""a free-born woman of irreproachable habits, could live with a man only in the capacity of his legitimate wife. A marriage ceremony did not make a marriage; virtue did. A dissolute woman was by law a concubine; no ceremony could make her anything more than that"" ARMA 73— More than an economic unit, the aristocratic family was also a school, specifically, a military school in which a father served as ""the first military instructor of his sons,"" and undertook ""the duty of making good soldiers out of them.
Its members were bound to support each other in difficult and dangerous contingencies,"" and also in everyday contingencies. The virtue of both partners was at a premium because the ancient world was a dangerous place ARMA The ""woman question"" in modernity looks quite different because modern, democratic, principles require equality under the law, and because modern society no longer centers economic or military life in the household. Ferrero has no objection to the modern liberation of women, but cautions that women will need to take greater responsibilities in order to balance their increased personal freedom.
The worst of both worlds would be the liberation of women into a world of hedonism, where women would wield power only so long as their beauty lasted [WC 40—41]. By Caesar's time the Roman aristocracy had declined. Ferrero agrees with his great liberal predecessor that Roman republicanism declined because empire corrupted the aristocrats.
The rich turned increasingly to ""the passion for amusing and good feeding,"" and infected the whole community with it GDR I. The republic still possessed considerable vitality. Above all, the discipline of the Roman constitution, and the reverence Romans felt toward it, and its ""impersonal authority of law and custom,"" remained—weaker than it had been, but still strong GDR I. The first attempt to counteract increased influence of the middle class and the equestrian order by the re-establishment of aristocracy-based republicanism was that of Sulla, who succeeded in establishing, briefly, not a new version of the old constitution, or an expanded empire, but ""simply a gigantic system of police"" GDR I.
Julius Caesar, then, confronted an aristocracy that had assumed most of the characteristics of an oligarchy. As a student of Aristotle's writings, he hoped to establish a mixed regime, balancing monarchic, aristocratic, oligarchic, and democratic elements. Caesar's marriage to Pompeia, a woman of the old nobility, was likely intended to balance his own early democratic leanings GDR I.
This attempt to found a mixed regime failed. Insofar as he succeeded, Caesar resembled a Tammany Hall boss, not an Aristotelian statesman, distributing bread to the poor in exchange for political support GDR I. Because the so-to-speak ""embourgeoisement"" of Rome had nothing of modern industrialism about it—neither the organization nor the technology—""the struggle of man against man was far more powerful than the struggle of man against nature,"" a point best seen in the fact that the immigrant workers of antiquity were slaves and freedmen forced to come to Rome GDR II.
Great as general and writer, Caesar ""failed to become a great statesman"" because, in a time of democratic passions, the man who stands aloof may retire and write books on philosophy, but ""he must stray into the hazardous paths of politics"" GDR II. Thus a book that appears to be an attempt to guide young scholars into the life of politics in fact warns them against doing so in such a time as the twentieth century. It would take a different, not nearly so literate or intellectual type to rule Rome.
Caesar had moved to the East in the last years of his life, eyeing the empire of Parthia. The road to Parthia led through Egypt and its queen. With his principal rival, Octavianus, in Rome, Antony had to do two things: Ferrero dismisses the legend of a grand passion, on either side of the affair. We see in love a certain forgetfulness of ourselves, a certain blindness of egoism and the more material passions, a kind of power of self-abnegation, which, inasmuch as it is conscious, confers a certain nobility and dignity; therefore we are indulgent to mistakes and follies committed for the sake of passion, while the ancients were very severe.
He married Cleopatra, without divorcing Octavia; brother Octavianus ""was disturbed not so much by the insult to his sister as by the increase of power which the marriage would bring to his brother-in-law"" GDR IV.
For her part, Cleopatra wanted to marry Antony in order to destroy domestic opposition to her rule, as the Polemaic monarchy, the last surviving dynasty founded by Alexander's generals, was now weak. These dovetailing strategies failed not because they were conceived in some paroxysm of erotic transport, but because they failed to reckon with the fundamentally patriotic and republican-imperial sentiments of the Roman army, which wanted nothing from Egypt or any other foreign country but subordination and treasure CE The war between Antony and Octavianus ""was not, as historians have stated, a struggle for monarchical power at Rome, but was to consolidate or to destroy the new Egyptian empire; it was not a war of Octavianus against Antony, but of Cleopatra against Rome.
When the couple arrived in Rome, it was a ""genuine aristocrat of the old stock,"" Domitius Ahenobarbus, who told Antony to send the Egyptian packing. The story of the fatal attraction between Antony and Cleopatra was invented by the poet Horace, friend of Octavianus, as ""an anti-feminist legend, intended to reinforce in the state the power of the masculine principle,"" that is, a leading principle of republicanism. It exempted the Roman, Antony, from the culpability of genuine betrayal of his country by explaining his actions in terms of seduction GDR IV.
Octavianus began his public career as a tyrant, ""the abomination of Italy,"" which explains why the Romans tolerated Antony's antics in Egypt for so long. But Octavanius' depredations were only ""the temporary aberrations of a weak character, exposed to overwhelming danger and crushed by over-burdening responsibility.
The legend is ridiculous Octavianus adopted a traditionalist policy, first in order to gather support against Antony, but then, after Antony's defeat, to foster the stability to which Octavianus' fundamentally timorous disposition inclined him. Victory at Actium brought Egyptian wealth into Roman coffers, without the need to ""easternize"" Rome; under such circumstances, conservatism made sense. Public opinion favored aristocracy, not the eastern-style despotism that Rome had just averted. There was no democratic sentiment ""as known to us"" in Rome, as ""every leader of the popular party was a noble of the old stock,"" and their call on behalf of the people was for land and money, not democratic equality.
The aristocrats faced a different problem: What was needed was what moderns would call a strong executive or president, and that was the office that Octavianus undertook to fill under the title of Caesar Augustus.
Cesare Lombroso topic Cesare Lombroso ; Italian: This ebook presents a collection of 2 works of Guglielmo Ferrero. He found in ancient Rome an example—the example—of the effects of ""quantifying"" a previously ""qualitative"" political society. There were no happy warriors among the troops of Spain. The History of Rome. The Republic of Augustus.
This was an office commended earlier by no less a republican than Cicero, the enemy of Julius Caesar. The tension between the mores of Roman republicanism and those of Egyptian monarchy became increasingly acute. The Roman aristocrats lived in homes profoundly different from those of their ancestors; ""their furniture costly, their paintings of the loves of Venus and of Bacchus often sensual and obscene; was it possible that such houses could become the holy precincts of that old patriarchal system, with its austere duties and occupations, which everybody professed anxiety to reconstruct?
As the aristocracy gradually ""lost all capacity for government,"" a ""great puritan movement"" sought to restore the old virtues. Augustus sponsored a series of reforms intended to restore patriarchal authority, the most notable being the lex de adulteries , whereby a husband could kill adulterous wives, daughters, and their lovers; more, anyone else might accuse adulterers in the law courts, in which case the penalty upon being found guilty was banishment. Ferrero notes that this was ""a piece of class legislation"" aimed not at the poor but at the rich. Ovid's Amores is an attack on such laws, which in practice led to much scandal without noticeably improving aristocratic conduct GDR IV.
Fifteen years into his rule, Augustus turned to foreign wars as an alternative attempt to reinvigorate the aristocracy. Barbarians could be conquered, but to rule them after conquest required precisely the vanishing virtues of the aristocrats, who much preferred to remain at home and at ease. It was increasingly difficult to turn out a quorum for Senate meetings in Rome, let alone to fire ambition for a foreign post among the young nobles.
Augustus' own household hardly mirrored the desired virtues. Daughter Julia ""introduced a new spirit into Roman female society, which had hitherto been represented by the consistent austerity of [her mother] Livia; and worldliness, luxury, pleasure, frivolity, sensuality and skepticism now became the order of the day. But the project of preserving republicanism clearly had failed.
All this notwithstanding, Ferrero calmly remarks, ""the government of Augustus was generally beneficial. But ""for the rest, [Rome] let every people live as best pleased it. Thus, even in decline, Roman republicanism and its empire staved off monarchism for decades. Historians like Mommsen, ""who sneer at the obstinate republicanism of the Romans, and regard the republic of Augustus as nothing more than a fiction,"" fail to consider the stakes. Romans regarded their polity as a res publica , owned by right by the Roman people, not as the property of a dynastic line.
Finally submerged beneath civic indifference, this Roman spirit nonetheless endured long enough so that it could be recovered during the Renaissance in a Europe made possible by Augustus' early defense of Rome against Egypt and his later treaty with the Parthians, which abandoned the policy of far eastern conquest undertaken by Alexander the Great, gave Rome freedom of action in Europe and kept the Parthians out of the Mediterranean GDR V.
Mommsen wants to be on the side of the winners. Eventually, in Rome, the monarchist-dynasts won. Ferrero nonetheless defends resistance to ""destiny.
Augustus and Tiberius were deceived. They wished to reanimate what was doomed…. They are the last representatives of the policy initiated by the Scipios and not the initiators of the policy that created the bureaucratic Empire of Diocletian; yet this is exactly their glory. They were right to be wrong CE In , not long before he died, Charles de Gaulle defended his refusal to acquiesce in the Soviet conquest of Poland after the Second World War, a conquest France could do nothing to prevent.
He was exercising his right to be wrong. Ferrero hereby qualifies his earlier attacks on statesmanly hubris. Statesmen do not control events. They should therefore consider themselves and their actions with due humility. Machiavelli is mistaken to imagine that Fortuna might be mastered. But neither should Fortuna be worshipped, because even the winners must compromise, and history lasts a long time.
The Need for Limits. In his writing prior to the Great War, Ferrero begins with the problem of militarism—more broadly, the problem of thumos. Although this flame scarcely burns in most of us, ""in all countries and in all ages there has existed a small minority of men in whom this desire was a violent passion, who wished to live a life more than humanly intense, almost, I might say, the life of several men"" M 55— This passion is no relic of a lost age of Achilles.
In modern times it may even be seen in the unlikely realm of aesthetics. In a book-length dialogue written just before the war, Ferrero has one character ask another why it is that, given the subjectivity of aesthetic judgments a subjectivity admitted by most moderns , we nevertheless want everyone else to admire what we admire. The answer is amour-propre—political, national, religious, intellectual. Judgments about beauty and ugliness finally ""depend on force,"" and we want to exercise force; we want to rule, and some of us will rule or ruin BOWN 71— Every limit we set for ourselves is arbitrary, questionable, surpassable.
And yet these imaginary lines are also indispensable to guide ourselves, to avoid a tumble into either lassitude or frenetic confusion. The unrestrained exercise of power yields the impotence of disorientation. Conventions are only conventions, but the need for conventions is as natural as a rock. Human resistance to destiny, what Ferrero commends in the Caesars, works in exactly this way. These forces limit those efforts. But the efforts also limit them. Human life itself is a matter of these reciprocal limitations BOWN — The conflict of the pre-war years was not, as Nietzsche would have it, between Dionysus and Apollo, but between Vulcan and Apollo.
Productive fire empowered the human desire for supreme liberty and power, deranging needed limits. To re-establish them, one needs the virtues that follow from the indisputable demonstration that goods compete, that to take one desired object will diminish our access to another BOWN —, Ferrero's history of Rome illustrates this.
In preserving Rome by writing its history, in attempting to get closer to the truth than Mommsen had done, a historian can show the need for limits both in the pages of his books and by example. The Great War as Regime Event. The Great War started because the civilization of quantity, in its peculiar German manifestation, overmastered the civilization of quality in Europe. This ""quantification"" also accounted for the scale and savagery of the war. Even more important for the future of Europe, the war demolished the old monarchies, thus adding political disorder to the moral disorder that began the war and was intensified by it.
In Ferrero asked the question that would haunt many intellectuals in the s: He concluded that Germany had attempted to combine the ""ancient"" and the ""modern"" in a uniquely insidious way: Germany ""had brought to greater perfection than any other nation [the] conception of progress which reconciles the idea of destruction with that of creation by affirming boldly that a people must strive to be great in peace and war alike, and that it is no less meritorious and glorious for it to force other nations to submit to its will than for it to conquer nature and to wrest her secrets from her"" EFH — As a result, a strict political discipline served moral and intellectual anarchy—a sense of limitlessness, ""frenzied pride"" or unfettered ambition EFH Ferrero finds this tendency to overcome contradictions by sheer, willed ""synthesis"" of opposites in the highest reaches of German thought.
While supposing themselves rationalists of a new sort, Kant and Hegel conceal the incoherence of their thought by the pompous obscurity of their prose. Their project leads in practice not to the peaceful ""end of history,"" whether republican or monarchist, but to a war of all against all, a sort of phantasmagoria of ""deconstruction"": The most sovereign of the ruling passions being the passion to rule, the libido dominandi will finally order all the other passions—political discipline, called the highest form of freedom, will prevail—but at the expense of a loss of the sense of reality, of limits, of contradiction.
The philosophies of almighty ""synthesis"" or ""absolute spirit"" thus incline toward the exaltation of victory: This ""philosophy fit for slaves"" fosters a spirit of tyrannical conquest, ending in the nation's self-destruction when the limited reality it seeks to overmaster proves recalcitrant to its boundless ambitions. What begins as an apparent quest for freedom ends in a submission to a supposed fatality. None of this is genuinely rational, in part because it abandons a prudent respect for conventional limits—an abandonment that the modern turn in philosophy effected, even as it liberated the desire for acquisition from the economics and politics of moderation.
The ""German"" atmosphere of European life contributed to the postwar rise of Italian Fascism. The only possible source of political authority in a post-monarchic world is popular sovereignty.
But when the people come to power in a civilization that has lost all sense of limits, they cannot know what they want. To be politically effective, popular sovereignty needs to devise means of expressing itself, that is, to rank its desires coherently. Without any traditions of self-government, a newly self-governing people might seize upon the expedient of a dictator-demagogue who appeals to the ruling passions of the moment in order to consolidate ""totalizing"" rule over a people disoriented by modern limitlessness UW 64—65; PPo viii, —; WD Such dictators quickly become tyrants, violating the core idea of popular sovereignty, which, to be truly popular, must respect the right of minority opposition while allowing the majority to govern without illegal subversion RE ; PPo — The French Revolution saw the first modern example of the self-destruction of popular sovereignty so misconceived.
The French Revolution and the Debacle of Bonapartism. The French Revolution asserted the sovereignty of the people, but popular sovereignty is not as simple in practice as it is in principle. How could their true will be recognized? Through what channels could it express itself? The revolutionary assertion of popular sovereignty in France occurred in reaction to one of the most ""statist"" or ""Asiatic"" regimes in Europe GDR V.
The people seized power, destroying the legal system of monarchism. The destruction of stable convention, of legality, made the ruling republicans fearful; their fear made them intolerant of opposition; their intolerance led them to coercion of the opposition, culminating in the political use of fear, the Terror, in order to assuage their fear. The sovereign people thus acted in an increasingly ""statist"" manner, but without the lawfulness of the formerly settled monarchy. The 18 th Fructidor—""liberty imposed by force,"" ""the Revolution seeking safety in suicide"" G— —led eventually to the 18 th Brumaire, which ""was not the work of Bonaparte but was carried out by part of the Directory"" RE 10; G — Like the Directory, and equally without the reassurance of stable legality, Bonaparte ""was afraid of everything: In mentality and method he anticipated every twentieth-century tyrant.
The Revolution did not adequately apply the principle of popular sovereignty because it could not. Ferrero does not excoriate the French revolutionaries quite as neo-Burkeans do, decrying the terrible simplification of ""abstract"" thinking.
Rather, he argues, that without a system of legal right to secure them, assertions of natural right raise suspicion, fear, and resistance—which in turn provoke suspicion, fear, and repression by the revolutionaries TFR , , , When he was demanding , heads, he was a man crazed by fear"" PPo — Behind libido dominandi , fear shivers. Rousseau has it exactly wrong: The revolution of , intended to be the liberation of the French people along the measured lines of eighteenth-century rationalism, issued ten years later in ""the first totalitarian government in Europe"" TFR In the United States and, eventually, in several places elsewhere, popular sovereignty led to no such result, because constructive legalism set limits on destructive fear and force TFR 5—9, 27, Another way to say this is that the Americans never abandoned prudential reasoning; Rousseau, although attempting to overcome the fear-ridden monarchist liberalism of Hobbes, based in its turn on the fear-ridden libido dominandi liberated by Machiavelli and conceptualized by Descartes—fears and ambitions that sweep away conventions—cannot overcome modern political philosophy.
And Rousseauian liberty in turn points ahead to the Germans. Local governments in France simply ""did not know how to proceed,"" never having governed anything, before—this, in contrast to the Americans TFR 62, 65, But the revolutionaries were too young, too inexperienced, too impassioned to listen PPo 78—80; TFR And so ""it took twenty-five years and oceans of blood to rebuild what six weeks had sufficed to destroy,"" namely the sense of legal limits without which tyranny takes over PPo With such shaky support at home, the fearful revolutionaries had recourse to a longstanding strategy of statists, commended by Machiavelli: Here too they contradicted their own initial theory.
The eighteenth-century political philosophers had devised rules of limited war. The law of nations as they conceived it was ""a body of wise and humane rules, designed to prevent abuses of force in relations between states, which do more harm to the states committing them than to those upon whom they are committed. A Brief History of the Middle Ages. The Sons of Caesar: Imperial Rome's First Dynasty. The History of England: The Rise and Collapse of the Roman Empire.
The Destruction of the Western Roman Empire. Italy and Her Invaders. The Amazing Emperor Heliogabalus. The Secret History Of Procopius. The Age of Charlemagne. A History of the Germanic Empire Volume 1. The History of Ancient Rome. The Rise of the Dutch Republic - Introduction.
A Short Introduction to Julius Caesar. The Heart of Rome. The Ides of March. Roman Life in the Days of Cicero. The Secret History of Procopius. The Provinces of the Roman Empire, v. The Historians of Ancient Rome. Provinces of the Roman Empire - Volume I.
The History of Rome. The Grandeur That Was Rome. Cicero and the Fall of the Roman Republic. The Tragedy of the Caesars. Criminal Woman, the Prostitute, and the Normal Woman. The Life of Caesar How to write a great review. The review must be at least 50 characters long.
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